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The Future of Nuclear Weapons In Europe Workshop Summary

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The Future of Nuclear Weapons In Europe
Workshop Summary

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INTRODUCTION

On July 26, 1991, the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory sponsored a one-day workshop on **The Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe**. (A list of workshop participants is found at the end of this report.) The workshop participants represented a mix of individuals from the Department of Energy and its national laboratories, other government agencies, the military services, academia, and industry. All attendees were chosen for their interest and expertise in the fields of European politics, international security policy, and American theater nuclear policy.

Workshop speakers were asked to prepare informal presentations on the views of the United States, the nations of Europe, and relevant international organizations, and to emphasize (1) the politics and military strategy associated with nuclear weapons and (2) the changing interrelationships between those political and military factors in today's rapidly changing international environment. The workshop leaders hoped thereby to stimulate critical thinking into the likely future of nuclear weapons in Europe, both East and West. Because the workshop took place before the failed mid-August coup in the Soviet Union, those who gave presentations at the workshop were given the opportunity to revise their remarks in light of the post-coup situation in the Soviet Union. The summary below reflects any changes that the participants elected to make, in addition to our own editorial adjustments.

The workshop also took place before President Bush's September 27, 1991, speech, which outlined a number of unilateral steps that the United States would take with respect to nuclear weapons, and that he hoped would be matched by the Soviet Union. Some of these measures will directly or indirectly affect the future of nuclear weapons in Europe, and the workshop proceedings should be read in this light:

- The United States will withdraw all land-based, short-range tactical nuclear weapons (artillery shells and *Lance* missiles) from Europe and elsewhere in the world, and will destroy these weapons without recourse to U.S.-Soviet arms-control negotiations on this subject. According to the president, "starting these talks now would only perpetuate these systems, while we engage in lengthy negotiations. Last month's events (i.e., the Soviet coup and its failure) not only permit, but indeed demand swifter, bolder action."
- The United States will at the same time retain "an effective air-delivered capability in Europe. That is essential to NATO security." The United States will not develop or deploy the proposed tactical air-to-surface missile known as the SRAM-T, however.

- No tactical nuclear weapons will routinely be deployed at sea or on naval aircraft, e.g., nuclear gravity bombs, nuclear depth charges. Moreover, cruise missiles will not be deployed on surface ships or submarines. Most of these nuclear weapons will be destroyed; some will be retained in central areas, where they would be available if necessary during a crisis.
- The United States calls on the Soviet Union to take similar actions — to destroy many of these tactical weapons and to "consolidate what remains at central locations." The Bush administration is clearly interested in encouraging the removal of Soviet short-range nuclear weapons from unstable areas and the establishment of firm central control over those that remain.

SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS

The following represents a summary of what the workshop organizers took away from the workshop; it is not intended to be comprehensive or represent the views of any or all of the participants. This summary includes an editorial sharpening of the lines of argument that emerged from the workshop discussions, at the risk of overlooking some important areas of controversy and uncertainty. For this the reader should consult the full synopses of the presentations and panel discussions that begin on page 4.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Based on the presentations and discussion at the workshop, we conclude that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will try to establish a minimum deterrent force of between 100 and 1,000 nuclear weapons based in Europe, most likely toward the lower end of that range. (Additional weapons will be made available, as at present, in the form of submarine-launched systems.) These European-based systems will consist entirely of dual-capable aircraft and gravity bombs. There will be no deployment of modernized U.S. nuclear systems. By the middle of the decade, however, political pressures in Germany will probably lead to the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons — and possibly all allied military forces — from German soil. This development, along with other political trends that are now evident, will force a major readjustment of the European security system, leading to a marginalization of the American role on the continent (as that role has traditionally been defined since the late 1940s). Recent remarks by German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher suggest that these pressures may begin to build even earlier than anticipated by the workshop participants.

U.S. Policy Options

Few workshop participants believed that this was a good outcome either for American interests or for long-term European security. The central question is: What is the best way to relegitimate the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and their positive role in allied strategy, especially to the Germans? (No one at the workshop challenged the point that nuclear weapons should continue to play an important role in allied security policy.)

There were two general lines of argument on this question. The first policy alternative involved reaching a grand bargain with the Germans in the form of a dramatic arms-control/policy initiative that would seek to preempt German concerns about nuclear weapons (e.g., by proclaiming a no-first-use policy) in return for German agreement to continue to accept a small number of air-delivered weapons, ideally modernized nuclear systems, on German soil. The second policy alternative was based on the assumption that such preemptive concessions to German public opinion would only reinforce the delegitimation of nuclear weapons, and that there remain important, perhaps dominant, elements in German politics that understand (or can be reminded) of the importance of nuclear deterrence. This second alternative preferred to focus on the fact that nuclear weapons will seem more, rather than less, central to the war-prevention task of the alliance as NATO's conventional forces are sharply

reduced in the wake of impending budget reductions.

The Future of European Security

Contrary to the common wisdom of a year ago, NATO seems likely to survive for some time as an important instrument of European security and trans-Atlantic cooperation. (The prospects for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE], by contrast, have dimmed considerably.) Despite the consensus on the preservation of NATO, there is a sense that the utility of the Atlantic Alliance will decrease significantly over time, as the task for which it is uniquely suited—to provide political-military security of the European allies against the Soviet threat—becomes much less prominent. Also, the Western Europeans are anxious, for a variety of reasons, to develop some sort of a European defense/security identity that will correspond to the economic and political union to which they are committed. The European Community (EC) is the logical umbrella for the formulation of this defense/security identity, but much remains uncertain and controversial, especially in light of the difficult European experience in the Gulf war and this summer's Yugoslavian crisis.

The German Question

The key to all of this is the Germans, who remain an enigma, even to themselves. At the present time there is simply no consensus among German political elites about the fundamental national security interests of their newly united regime. To be sure, there is no indication of a revival of traditional German nationalism and militarism. Quite the contrary: There are strong popular trends toward seeing Germany as a very large Switzerland (or Denmark)— inward-looking, focused on economic matters, convinced that it does not face a serious military threat, and persuaded that military power really does not matter very much in the post-Cold War era. A turn in German politics in this direction would point toward the end of traditional German support for nuclear deterrence and a U.S. nuclear presence on German soil. By the terms of the Two-Plus-Four agreement that ended the division of Germany, the territory of the former East Germany is to remain nuclear-free. A future German government may well wish to end this anomaly, not by insisting on the deployment of nuclear weapons in its eastern territories, but rather by denuclearizing the rest of Germany (and of Europe).

There is currently no significant German interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Beyond the year 2000, however, one can postulate scenarios in which an independent German option might seem attractive. This would require not only a reemergence of the Soviet threat, but also a breakdown in the nonproliferation regime and the spread of nuclear weapons to other European states, coupled with the lack of a convincing American or British/French security guarantee. Short of such a dramatic change in the strategic environment, the domestic political barriers to German acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the fears of neighboring states, are currently too strong for such a drastic change in Germany's nuclear status.

Britain, France, and the Prospects for an Independent European Nuclear Deterrent

These two European nuclear powers will unquestionably maintain national nuclear forces irrespective of how Europe, collectively or nationally, defines its future security. Perhaps the most interesting question concerns the possibility of increased British-French nuclear cooperation. The Conservative government in London has yet to select a missile to carry its projected new tactical nuclear warhead, designed to replace its nuclear gravity bombs. Candidates for the British Tactical Air-to-Surface-Missile (TASM) are the American SRAM-T, (which was cancelled in September 1991), the American supersonic low-altitude target (SLAT), or the Air-Sol Longue Porté (ASLP), which would be coproduced with the French (This decision is already overdue, and there are indications of further delays by the British.)

The outcome of this decision will provide a strong indication about where the British, at least under Prime Minister John Major, see their future—with the American special relationship or with Europe.

Given the difficulties that may emerge between the United States and Germany over nuclear weapons, some Europeans have attempted to revive an old proposed solution to this problem: the creation of an independent European nuclear capability and policy that would involve the Germans through such agencies as the European Community or the Western European Union (WEU). Such a capability would presumably consist of some or all of the current British and French nuclear forces. The presentation given at the workshop on this subject, however, concluded that there is now apparently no serious interest in the idea by the present governments of France, Britain, or Germany. It was also noted that this attitude could change with a shift in government, especially in Germany.

The Soviet Union and Nuclear Weapons

The Soviet government (and very likely any successor regime, Russian or otherwise) has come to accept the American presence in Europe—including U.S. nuclear weapons—as essentially stabilizing. The Soviets remain concerned about the long-term future of Germany and believe that American forces/nuclear weapons offer an important restraint against future German ambitions in the East. On this basis Moscow would like to reach an American-Soviet understanding on minimum deterrence for theater nuclear forces (TNF) as the only way to legitimate any future nuclear deployments in Europe. The broad parameters of a potential deal on short-range nuclear forces (SNF), from the Soviet perspective, might involve the total elimination of land-based systems and constraints on the numbers of nuclear-capable aircraft, with a level of roughly 500 warheads on each side.

From a military-strategic perspective, the lessons of the Gulf war, coupled with the collapsing Soviet economy, have convinced Soviet officials that they cannot compete with the West in high-technology conventional forces and that nuclear weapons represent the only means to sustain even a limited participation in the strategic competition with the West. Nuclear weapons are relatively cheap, the Soviets know that they can build them with confidence, and they do not have to work perfectly to fulfill their political and military purpose. In the future, strategic nuclear forces will represent a first-order defense for the Soviet Union.

In this analysis it was assumed that if there was a breakup of the Union, Russia would inherit the nuclear legacy of the USSR, and that the other republics would not possess independent nuclear forces. Recent developments have also called this assumption into question.

The Eastern European Question

The most important of the Eastern European states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) continue to favor an American presence in Europe under the auspices of NATO, which implicitly includes an American nuclear presence. The presentation to the workshop on this subject concluded that there is now no serious interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any state in Eastern Europe, but that there were imaginable circumstances in which such an option might be considered. One combination of circumstances would be a situation in which it appeared that the Soviet Union had irrevocable designs to reoccupy these states, that the West had no intention of extending any meaningful nuclear guarantee over Eastern Europe, and that war was inevitable. Also, if several Soviet republics (e.g., the Ukraine) acquired nuclear weapons as a consequence of the breakup of the USSR, this too might trigger proliferation throughout the region. Such circumstances do not appear very likely at the moment, but they cannot be definitely ruled out over the longer term.

THE EVOLVING EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The first workshop session offered a broad political and diplomatic overview of a Europe

that has undergone dramatic changes over the past two years. This session was intended to provide the backdrop for the subsequent panels that dealt with nuclear issues in more detail.

The underlying theme of this session's presentation was that the old order in Europe has disappeared. Europe is currently a continent in search of itself. All of the old verities and assumptions about European security are being challenged, if they have not already been overturned. We are going through a period of transition, with the end-state not quite clear, although in the past year some of the probable elements of the new framework have become more visible. For example, a consensus seems to have emerged, especially since the NATO meetings of spring 1991, that the Atlantic Alliance should continue to exist and perform the core functions it has performed in the past and that the United States should retain a role in European security. But these assumptions are hedged, at least in some of the European countries, by a number of (often unspoken) preconditions and expectations about how the alliance's decision-making and military structures will change.

The most critical part of the European search for identity is Germany: the Germans appear unsure what they think of themselves. The emotional overload of the events of the past two years, coupled with the very large set of adjustments that the Germans have had to make, has led to a collective self-absorption on the part of Germany, approaching a "collective nervous breakdown." Many critical issues are not yet even being discussed in Germany, and no articulated plan for the future has emerged, even among the political elites. This point was reemphasized in several subsequent presentations.

There are several other points to make as Europe searches for itself. The first involves a rethinking of very basic political questions. What is a state? What purpose does the military serve, if one assumes an environment in which there is a very low (or no) probability of a major conflict in Europe for the foreseeable future? Second, we must take into account the tyranny of existing organizations—the propensity to turn to familiar ways of doing business when faced with difficulties and uncertainties. Third, the new democratic political leaderships in east-central Europe and the new German *Länder* will undoubtedly experience growing pains as they go through the process of on-the-job-training. Fourth, in the West the old elites are being replaced by new leaders; in most of the major countries, there will also be crucial elections in the next few years that could bring about a significant change in the profile of European politics. Finally, there remains a fundamental uncertainty over the future of the former USSR and how it (or its constituent parts) will relate politically and militarily to Europe.

The Institutions of European Security

The most likely outcome of the European search for identify over the next decade will be a mix of old and new institutions, coupled with an assertion of a European defense/security identity (rhetorically if not organizationally). NATO in particular appears likely to survive, in part because of the determination of the Americans and the British to keep it alive, and in part because it represents a time-proven and successful way for the nations of Western Europe and North America to deal with one another. This is a different answer than one might have given a year ago, when the dominant notions pointed toward a very different kind of security structure (e.g., the CSCE or some other type of pan-European security organization, one in which the United States might not fully participate).

Why has the promise of pan-European security, circa 1990, not been completely realized? On the positive side some institutionalization of the CSCE has taken place, and the governments of Eastern Europe and Germany remain interested in using the CSCE as a means of bringing the Soviet Union into Europe peacefully, as well as a means of conflict prevention and containment. But the simple inability to make the institution responsive to major developments in Europe, most notably the Baltic and Yugoslavian crises of recent months, has

chastened, if not dashed, those who would promote the CSCE as the dominant European security mechanism.

If the European Community continues along the path on which it has started, it will be the core around which a future European security identity will be defined. The EC continues its progress on the political and economic side toward the goals of 1992, but there are questions about whether much more can or will be done. (The basic problem for the EC is that many of the original conditions and balances on which it was founded have changed, given Germany's new weight and the questions that have emerged in the Franco-German relationship, which is the center of the EC.) Clearly, on the security side the failure of the EC to achieve any kind of realistic coordination with respect to the Gulf war has had an enormous psychological impact. The promise to come up with the rudiments of an agreement by December 1991 as to what precisely its security goals will be is a significant indicator of the Community's interest in this area.

Central Political Relationships

From the American perspective, the Gulf war brought many issues surrounding the relationships between the European and North Atlantic states to the fore. There are some who would conclude that the U.S.-German relationship, in which the Bush administration placed so much stock, simply fell apart when confronted with an out-of-area threat. On the other hand, the Anglo-American special relationship was revived during the war, and the ease with which American and British military establishments dealt with one another has had a significant impact on the thinking of many about what will be possible in terms of intensive military relationships with Europe in the future.

France emerged from the war, in the European and the Atlantic context, as a loser. France's conventional performance during the war was poor, and President François Mitterrand's last-minute diplomatic maneuvering won him no points with anyone. Paris has also been largely unsuccessful in its efforts to work out new relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and even some of the smaller states in the EC. By their own actions the French may have thus contributed to the outcome they most feared: a Europe shifting eastward, led by a strong, reunified Germany with interests and ambitions in the East. Paris must also be concerned that, if the EC fails to maintain its forward momentum, the Germans may look for different realms of action and will be less integrated into Europe than the French would want.

Great Britain finds itself in one more phase in the diplomacy of downward adjustment, as the transition of power from Margaret Thatcher to John Major points toward the conclusion that Britain will become, over time, a better European state with much closer ties to Germany. The major strategic constraints on Britain are its economic weakness and social problems, which in turn affect the amount of money available to the military. This suggests that a different set of arrangements for Britain may be in order—perhaps turning more toward Europe and European organizations as a lifeboat and a means of preserving some level of British influence—especially if the Anglo-American special relationship does not continue.

Germany remains the central element in the unfolding European drama. Everyone, including the Germans, is waiting and watching to see what develops there. Germany's allies are just beginning to realize the immense psychological dynamics of reunification, as the Germans ask themselves "who are we?" and "where do we belong?" There is something to the caricature of Germany wanting to be Switzerland: fat, wealthy, happy, and unencumbered by outside obligations. The result of this tendency is a set of diplomatic moves that could be called a "campaign of smiles," saying "yes" to all comers but hoping that everyone will eventually go away and leave the Germans alone.

Given this uncertainty about the future of Germany, there are two critical factors undergirding the role of nuclear weapons in Europe that have not received enough attention. The first factor involves the politically undigested lump of East Germany. The popu-

lation of the eastern *Länder* feel cheated by the Kohl government's promises on their economic well-being. The electorate in the east is discouraged and politically alienated, facts that could cost Helmut Kohl and the Christian Democratic party (CDU) the next election. This could also upset the long-standing German party structure as it has emerged between the CDU, the Social Democrats, and the Free Democrats, in which there was a common discourse and set of issues up for competition. One of the most sensitive political topics that could trigger a revolution in German politics is the issue of nuclear weapons and the nuclear relationship with the United States.

The second under-appreciated factor is the status imposed on the eastern regions of Germany as a result of the Soviet-German bargain of February 1990. (Under the terms of this bargain the territory of the former German Democratic Republic is to be nonnuclear, and no allied forces are to be stationed or deployed there.) Pressures are already evident to maintain this status and even extend the special demilitarized region westward, once Soviet troops complete their withdrawal in 1994.

Both of these issues demonstrate the critical importance of German domestic politics in determining the course of German foreign policy. The situation today may be similar to that of the early 1980s, in which the German government adjusts its foreign policy in order to keep domestic political harmony—even if such foreign policy changes have more dangerous ramifications than the domestic troubles would have. No German politician has any idea what the internal political situation will look like after the Soviet forces leave, especially if the general economic situation remains bleak. But it could result, as noted above, in the political defeat of the CDU and a sea change in German politics.

Finally, the management of relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will be more in German hands than those of any other power. The new Central European Pentagonale group (Italy, Austria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, with Poland also interested in membership) is an intriguing attempt at developing a regional framework—attempting to create a countervailing trade and policy bloc outside of German influence. Such balancing games hark back to similar efforts in the Balkans in the 1890s and 1920s.

The real key to this and other important questions will be the evolution of German-Soviet relations after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from German soil in 1994. Will it become a relationship in which Germany is the friend of and entrepreneur for the Soviets (or Russians)? Will Germany play the game of backing the more promising political and national candidates in a fractured Soviet Union? The Germans have historically perceived high stakes in a reach toward the east, in a civilizing mission that the Germans have often felt toward Russia and Eastern Europe. The German-Soviet Treaty of July 1990 contains hints as to how that relationship might evolve post-1994 in terms of security relationships and economic understandings. In short, it would appear that this special role of Germany toward Mitteleuropa will again be very high on the German list of preferences for its future international role.

Discussion

The participants expressed a number of opinions about Europe's future security identity in general, and the prospects for NATO in particular. In one view NATO may be facing a long, slow retirement, rather than an abrupt dismissal. NATO's core functions limit the alliance to dealing with issues that are becoming increasingly remote, most notably, direct threats to the territorial integrity of NATO members. Emerging threats will not involve NATO, as evidenced by the Yugoslav crisis, in which the EC took the lead. How the United States responds to this shift will be very important. The Europeans have observed our actions during the Gulf crisis, where we took the lead, and during the Yugoslav crisis, where we pushed the Europeans out front. This suggests to the Europeans those kinds of problems that the United States regards as central to its interests and those it does not. If this is in fact our policy,

the Europeans will undoubtedly realize even more the need for the EC or a Euro-centric security organization. A significant danger in the process of redefining European security is immobility: under the present circumstances it is difficult to believe that the current political leaders will undertake serious changes in the structure of alliances or national contributions.

Another participant expressed the view that NATO was in little danger of being replaced by some alternative security structure. Most Europeans regard NATO as the principal structure for the integration of political-military decision making, both in the European and the Atlantic framework. (To be sure, political-military issues are becoming less salient, but that is another issue.) The EC is trying to move in this direction, but the trends today—versus those of just six months ago—do not seem to favor a strong, independent European defense identity.

Furthermore, according to this participant, nuclear weapons may actually become an even more important and more legitimate part of the European defense structure in years ahead as conventional armed forces become more fragile and are gutted by budget cuts. As weapons of mass destruction proliferate in the third world, people should see the value of existential deterrence (nuclear weapons deter because they exist) through some residual nuclear capability. Whom will the Germans (and other European states) turn to for such protection? Most likely the United States, assuming the United States can then base such weapons there in a way that does not cause serious political problems. Stationing nuclear weapons in Germany is not a lost cause yet, but the alliance can make this a self-fulfilling prophecy by assuming that there is no future for nuclear weapons there. If the United States believes that nuclear weapons should remain an important part of the European defense posture, then it must publicly make a persuasive case.

Another participant noted that there is no consensus emerging yet on what Europe's future security identity will look like. The discussions about a European security identity have not been going well. In addition, the flank states of the alliance are concerned about agreeing to a French-German-dominated security arrangement. These states also question how they shall receive military support and nuclear deterrence that only Washington has been able to provide in the past. All of this points to a continuing important role for the United States and American nuclear weapons.

That said, there is much below the surface that challenges the old strategic bargain—i.e., the European recognition that in the face of the Soviet threat there was a need for a close strategic relationship with the United States and the presence of American nuclear weapons on European soil. With the diminution in the Soviet threat, there is an increasing view that the Europeans do not need the old partnership, whereby decisions about nuclear weapons were largely made by Washington without adequate allied consultation. Such trends will tend to undermine the long-term future of nuclear weapons in Europe (at least of those not under the control of the governments that will be deciding their use). These issues need to be openly discussed among the allied governments. There may be dangers in continuing the present conspiracy of silence on these questions.

THE SOVIET UNION, EASTERN EUROPE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In the day's second session three speakers presented viewpoints from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Soviet Defense Ministry, and the former Warsaw Pact members of Eastern Europe. The government and military establishments in the Soviet Union are in a period of transition and reconfiguration, trying to understand their new roles in a more open society while developing new working relationships with one another. Nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy will play a key role in this reevaluation and its likely outcome. Eastern Europe, meanwhile, is trying to create its own identity and develop closer ties to the West.

These presentations were given several weeks before the failed coup attempt in the Soviet Union. The participants were subsequently

asked whether that event in any significant way changed their remarks, and were offered the opportunity to alter the text of the proceedings accordingly. With the exception of a few minor changes, they did not do so, on the grounds that the fundamental points of their argument about the Soviet Union and nuclear weapons remained unchanged—that a central entity is likely to retain control of nuclear weapons (whether that entity is Russia or a Union government), and that this entity is likely to have the same concerns and interests as those that were put forward at the time of the workshop. The terms Soviet and Soviet Union used in this report are intended to refer to whatever core entity emerges from the old Soviet Union.

The View from the Soviet Foreign Ministry

A member of the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate of the Foreign Ministry in Moscow visited Los Alamos a week prior to this workshop. He saw the primary mission of Soviet foreign policy as twofold: to facilitate the integration of the USSR into the European community of nations and to overcome the view of the Soviet Union as the enemy.

There is a renewed appreciation in Moscow for the political and military value of nuclear weapons. The reasons for this belief include the Gulf war (with the tremendous success of advanced Western conventional weapons), the changing strategic realities facing the USSR, and particularly the continuing internal Soviet economic crisis. A consensus exists within the Soviet policy community that the USSR will continue to rely on nuclear weapons for security; indeed, some within the military and elsewhere believe that the Soviets will increase their reliance on nuclear forces during the 1990s—that nuclear weapons represent the only means to sustain even a limited participation in the strategic competition with the West.

This said, there is a vigorous internal debate over the nature, scope, and contours of nuclear deterrence. The Foreign Ministry has taken on the responsibility of forcing all other agencies to accept nuclear deterrence as the *modus operandi* of the Soviet Union during the 1990s. The development of the U.S.-Soviet relationship may mean different (lower) numbers, different force structures, and different operational concepts, but nuclear weapons will remain the central focus of that relationship. The debate is currently focused on concepts of unacceptable damage as a key force-sizing criterion. (The present calculations are based on a balance of forces and not on the potential to inflict unacceptable damage.) In the context of a future Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Soviet Foreign Ministry believes that the military has settled on a minimum acceptable level for deterrent purposes: 4,000 strategic warheads, which should ensure that at least 1,000 would strike the United States, thereby reducing the United States to the status of a third-world state with a thirty-year recovery period. Having less than 4,000 weapons would be viewed by Soviet military planners as destabilizing.

In the future the Soviet nuclear weapons program, both tactical and strategic, will be driven not just by arms control or calculations of military effectiveness, but by a range of new pressures, for example, center-republic relations. The ministry official claimed that all tactical nuclear warheads had now been removed from Eastern Europe and from the outer rim of the Soviet empire (e.g., the Baltics, the Caucasus) and that Moscow may soon need to consolidate all its nuclear forces in the Russian republic.

Turning to European security, the official stressed the value of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which puts Europe on the threshold of the post-Cold War era and represents a major step toward stability. The level of forces is still too high, and the agreement did not capture qualitative factors, but by focusing on quantity, the treaty addressed the key Western concern about the offensive potential of the Soviet Union. The major political result of CFE was therefore to pave the way for Soviet integration into Europe and Western civilization, a result that was possible only once the threat to the West was removed and

the new force levels were modified. He hopes that the implementation of CSCE will point toward the transition to a comprehensive, all-European security system. But he recognizes that a set of latent uncertainties is emerging. The first, paradoxically, is the elimination of the Western threat to the USSR, which removes a cohesive element in Soviet society and increases the tendency towards disintegration. Second, the removal of the Soviet threat removes an element of cohesion for the Western security system, perhaps leading to the reemergence of national ambitions. Third, the Soviets are concerned with the emergence of a united Germany as a major player in Eastern Europe, which is being brought about by geopolitical reality and which will continue irrespective of which political party [illegible] Germany. At the same time, the Soviets see an eventual Russian-German *rapprochement* as inevitable, at least in the political and economic realms, and they see a united Germany as the most important partner supporting the integration of the Soviet Union into Europe and the world community.

The removal of the external threat puts in doubt a continued American role in Europe. The official anticipates great pressures on the United States to leave Europe, but they will not [illegible] the Soviet Union. It is a clear Soviet interest to keep the United States on the Continent. The Soviet Union would like to keep U.S. troops in Europe for three distinct reasons: as a guarantee against German ambitions, as a hedge against potential instability, and as a way of constraining American global ambitions.

The issue of nuclear weapons in Europe is primarily a political one, and the official acknowledged the fact that the United States had deployed its nuclear weapons on the Continent as a means of keeping trans-Atlantic coupling alive. The Soviet Union, for its part, does not need theater nuclear weapons as long as it has a very survivable strategic nuclear force posture. The Soviet theater nuclear weapons buildup of the past had represented only a symmetrical response to the U.S. deployment, and there is no need for parity in TNF. Asymmetric reductions are therefore possible.

The official outlined the development of the shift in the Soviet position on the so-called third zero. The Soviets previously appreciated the importance of theater nuclear weapons to the United States, but ideology, the military's insistence on the denuclearization of Europe, and simple bureaucratic inertia sustained the old approach. The turning point in Soviet internal deliberations came in 1988, and Gorbachev gave a clear political signal in his 1989 Strasbourg speech: the denuclearization of Western Europe was no longer a Soviet goal, and the Soviets were now ready to discuss a minimum deterrence posture for theater nuclear weapons. Within the Soviet national security community at large, and even within the Soviet military itself, there is now an acceptance of the necessity of the U.S. presence in Europe, and a recognition of the fact that part of the price they must pay for that is the continued stationing of American TNF on the Continent. In terms of future TNF posture, the Soviets would prefer to see a minimal deterrent made up primarily of air-launched weapons. For the West, these would act as weapons of last resort; for the Soviet Union, air-delivered weapons would enable them to counter NATO's naval nuclear strength, which has great political symbolism in the USSR.

The Soviet desire to move toward a minimal deterrent posture on both sides is the only conceivable way of legitimizing any future nuclear presence in Europe. The official professed not to understand the American delay in dealing with this topic; without such a Soviet-American understanding the Germans might cause problems (i.e., once Soviet forces are withdrawn from eastern Germany in 1994, Berlin may request an American withdrawal as well). He believes that negotiations could help overcome the reluctance of the Germans to accept modernized TNF. The broad parameters of a potential deal on SNF would involve the total elimination of land-based systems and constraints on the numbers of nuclear-capable aircraft, with a level of roughly 500 warheads

on each side. Bilateral U.S.-Soviet negotiations can act as a guarantee against German nuclear potential, and against any other third-party ambitions.

The View from the Ministry of Defense

The traditional Soviet military doctrinal and strategic view will be presented first because it contrasts so starkly with the way in which business is currently being done by the senior military leadership.

The traditional military-strategic perspective from the Ministry of Defense is quite bleak. First, the Warsaw Pact is gone; in the past, Soviet military analysis had assumed that the Eastern Europe allies would fight in a war with NATO (whatever political problems might have existed with this assumption). Second, and more important to the Soviet military, is the loss of Eastern Europe as a security *glacis* and as a forward deployment and operating area. Third, the Soviet armed forces must face the obvious and demonstrated qualitative superiority of Western forces, as demonstrated so visibly during the Gulf war. The American ability to project substantial conventional forces at great distances was especially impressive. Fourth, the unification of Germany has very serious potentially military implications. Fifth, new nuclear delivery systems—notably the next generation of cruise missiles and dual-capable systems—have begun to concern the Soviet military-technical community. Sixth, there is the potential growth and development of U.S. strategic nuclear defense, which, in light of the U.S. Senate's views on this subject, now seems more realistic to the Soviet General Staff than it did in the mid-to-late 1980s. Finally, Soviet military planners are now looking at the prospect of initial conventional defensive operations on Soviet territory, which probably envisions the trading of territory for time and the opportunity to mobilize. This defensive phase might extend not just for weeks but for months before the Soviets could undertake counter-offensive operations.

In traditional terms all this points toward the development of qualitatively improved general-purpose forces with a strong high-technology push. These forces would be smaller, and more flexible and mobile. There should also be a strong interest in defensive engineering (e.g., fortifications and obstacles) and on mass mobilization for major military threats.

But this military-strategic analysis must not be taken out of context. The Ministry of Defense actually sees its real problems much differently. First, the Soviet military recognizes that there exist in Soviet society two strong political-social sentiments that will act as severe constraints on their future. One sentiment is antimilitary: the military is blamed for the country's economic, technological, and social problems. This antimilitary viewpoint is strongly intertwined with a widespread antitechnology sentiment. Second, the military realizes that it can no longer count on the unfailing support of the political leadership to overcome such societal opposition. The most important reality is the diffusion of political power: the loss of authority by the center and the growth of republicanism within the USSR. The combination of these two factors has caused the Ministry of Defense to realize that the military has lost many of its long-standing claims on resources and prestige in Soviet society.

In the past, Soviet political leaders fully supported the view that Soviet power could be equated with the strength of the armed forces, and the military benefitted accordingly. Today, the new political leadership, in the context of resurgent republicanism, comes down in a very different direction on this issue. The republican governments strongly favor reductions in the size of the military as well as breaking down the defense industries and turning them toward civil production. A new political phenomenon has also emerged that further complicates the military's position: the rise of localism. No one is certain who is in control, or who has the right to exercise authority and command in the new political system. It is a chaotic situation, dominated by a power struggle between central and regional governments. Local governments now have much more power and can determine military policy.

for example, by refusing to allow nuclear testing or by closing bases arbitrarily.

Adding to this confusing situation is the "party-ization" of Soviet life. In the past the Communist party was in a position to make things happen, and largely in the military's favor, but the military cannot now turn to the party for assistance in overcoming this local resistance. In addition, new political parties are emerging (e.g., the New Democratic Movement) that, with the exception of some insignificant reactionary groups, are antimilitary. Finally, there is the impact of the mass politicization of the country. The military no longer has to deal just with the elites, or even with a reform wing of the party. In institutional terms the Soviet military must now do much more than just report to and interact with a small group of friendly officials and defense industrialists -- there are other ministries with designs on the military's resources and authority, as well as an inquisitive national legislature and republic governments. This is a radically different decision-making environment, complicated by the fact that *glasnost* and democratization have opened up defense policy to scrutiny by the public for the first time. And almost universally the popular press is antimilitary and antitechnology.

In short, the political and social environment that has nurtured Soviet military power for the past forty years has collapsed. Given this bleak situation the Soviet general staff is planning a future based on a core Soviet state, consisting of Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia. But the sort of ideal high-technology general-purpose force described above is not a realistic goal. The defense of this core state must therefore rely in the first instance on nuclear weapons, based on a low-manpower, low-quality conventional support establishment.

This position is also supported by economic realities. The Soviet military understands that it will see significantly declining resources in the decade ahead. The defense industries have lower priority access to materials, coupled with a marked decline in the efficiency and the quality of defense production. The technology base itself is crumbling through a pr[illegible] degenerative conversion as defense re[illegible] are cut and the most talented individua[illegible] hazardly find other avenues of employment. The technical coordination system [illegible] the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK) [illegible] which has been so essential to the defense industries, is also breaking down. As a result the conventional force system will suffer with respect to both technical and mission capability. But even if the defense industry could deliver well-made, high-technology conventional weapons, the Soviet military would still have to overcome the poor quality of the average soldier.

So the planners are left with those things that they can build with confidence, that are relatively cheap, and that work even if they do not function perfectly; that is, they are left with nuclear weapons. Soviet nuclear technologies are mature and comparable to American technologies. This is the one remaining area in which the military feels that it can compete with the West. To be sure, Soviet nuclear weapons R&D is also in trouble for the same political and economic reasons described above, and the Soviet military remains concerned with the new U.S. nuclear technology programs. Even so, nuclear technologies can to some extent be isolated and protected from the general collapse of the Soviet economy, unlike conventional technologies, which depend on a much broader industrial and technology base.

The bottom line is therefore that strategic nuclear forces will represent the first order of defense for the Soviet Union under all contingencies. Strategic nuclear par[illegible] can be expected to act as a deterrent against all forms of attack against the Soviet state because it allows the USSR to destroy the homeland of the would-be aggressor. A modernized tactical nuclear force is a possibility as a second order of defense, in combination with defensive obstacles and fortifications.

Finally, Russia is likely to inherit the nuclear shield of the Soviet Union over the next decade, and this will be the context in which future nuclear policy will evolve.

Perspectives from Eastern Europe

For the past forty years the United States has paid relatively little attention to the states of Eastern Europe on the assumption that they were merely adjuncts to Soviet foreign and military policy. We are now attempting to learn about these individual countries from scratch a daunting task.

Three basic themes are evident in a study of Eastern Europe today. First, the region's future is uncertain - it faces economic difficulties, ethnic disputes, and other problems that will imperil the newly-formed democratic governments. The very nature of the region could change over the next few years, with some countries breaking up and others emerging. We will have to learn increasingly how to deal with ambiguous forms of statehood. Second, there is no consensus over Eastern Europe's future role in European security. Most states want to join the West in some fashion, but they are receiving little favorable response to such requests from Western institutions. Moscow still wants to maintain a sphere of influence in the region, so the people of Eastern Europe are understandably insecure. Third, the Soviet Union (or whatever core state might emerge from the present union) will continue to be the most powerful military actor on the European continent, and the West will retain an interest in balancing that power, although perhaps differently than it has done in the past. Eastern Europe will affect that balance in ways that will affect its own security.

The Eastern European nations have entered a period of considerable instability that may not end in democracy. Bulgaria and Romania have not yet broken with communism. Yugoslavia, in all probability, is approaching a violent end, which will destroy the fragile stability of the Balkans for some time to come. Albania has more the character of a third-world than a European state. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary stand the best chance, but they too face very serious obstacles in moving toward democracy. All of these nations face the challenge of sanitizing their societies after four decades of communism. The single most important element affecting Eastern Europe's chance of success is that of economic reform. Their economies all suffer from excessive dependence on trade with the Soviet Union and from foreign debt, aging and uncompetitive industries, a disintegrating infrastructure, and the costs associated with cleaning up massive amounts of environmental pollution. All of these problems must be faced simultaneously, with very limited resources. The Eastern European states have not yet been able to create a climate that would attract Western investment on the scale that would be needed to turn their economies around.

The Soviet Union, in the meantime, is making these problems more difficult. The Eastern European states are highly dependent on the Soviet Union for energy and for markets. The USSR has been cutting back on deliveries of energy while insisting on being paid in hard currency at free market prices, but Moscow then spends that currency in the West rather than for Eastern European goods. The economic crisis in Eastern Europe places great pressure on the nascent democracies and could lead to the emergence of authoritarian governments. Thorough economic reform is essential to establish democracy, but most of the Eastern European governments are afraid to proceed rapidly with reform, given the fear that further austerity measures will inflame ethnic and social tensions.

The Eastern Europeans are presently feeling insecure in the more traditional geopolitical context as well. When the new governments first came to power, they argued that the continuation of NATO once the Warsaw Pact had been dissolved would perpetuate the division of Europe. That view is now gone. It has been replaced by a consensus that NATO and a U.S. military presence in Europe is indispensable. They are alarmed at the lack of an expressed Western interest in their security; this means that future security could be dependent on the good will or forbearance of the Soviet Union/ Russia, and they are very pessimistic about their future relationships with Moscow. On the one hand, the Eastern European states tend to anticipate a greater continuity of interests and

policy between the old Soviet Union and whatever core state might emerge there in the long term than does the United States or Western Europe. On the other hand, the Eastern Europeans are probably even more concerned that domestic instability will cause the Soviet Union to break up violently, thus destabilizing European security — and the Eastern European states would be the first to feel the effects.

In the short term Eastern Europeans believe that the Soviet Union is seeking to maintain its sphere of influence in the region through new bilateral treaties that will replace the old Warsaw Pact arrangement. These proposed treaties, which surfaced in February-March of this year, would place severe constraints on Eastern European national sovereignty, security, and defense. The treaties would prohibit the Eastern Europeans from joining groups against the interests of the Soviet Union and from permitting the stationing of foreign troops on Eastern European territory. There are also vague clauses that would guarantee the Soviets undisturbed transit across Eastern European national territory for the twenty-year duration of the agreements. The Poles have said that they will not sign, but other states in the region have indicated a possible interest in accepting at least some of these conditions.

In a general sense the Eastern Europeans fear being left outside the emerging structure of European security. They are concerned that the West might accept Moscow's view of security in Eastern Europe rather than their own. They worry about the possibility of U.S. disengagement from European defense. They fear that any course for Germany other than one of deep integration into Europe and participation in a U.S.-led alliance will endanger Eastern Europe — if not directly from Germany, then from an adverse Soviet reaction. For the most part, the Eastern Europeans no longer believe that CSCE can provide real security if a serious threat arises, and they fear being excluded from any Western European security system that might be built around the EC and the WEU. Some have expressed a preference for NATO to transform itself into a European-wide security and defense system that they could join.

To these problems we should add that membership in Eastern Europe may soon expand, with all of the complications that this might entail. Independence for the Baltic republics could create new problems. Once the Baltic states formalize their independence from the Soviet Union, there will be the possibility of friction with Russia over the substantial Russian population that will remain in these newly formed countries. Also, these states may have to make defense concessions to the central Union government (e.g., naval basing rights and air defense) that will give them a somewhat ambiguous cast in the eyes of Western defense planners. In the Slavic part of the Soviet Union both the Ukraine and Byelorussia have growing nationalist movements, and they may stay in or leave the Union. But they already have their own foreign policy and, in the case of the Ukraine, an interest in their own territorial armed forces. It is not hard to imagine a conflict at some point in the future between the Ukraine and Poland over a variety of issues — a conflict that would have the shadow of a much larger Soviet military power looming in the background.

From the standpoint of the defense of Western Europe against a renewed Soviet threat, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are the three most important countries because they lie on the main routes of invasion from the East. All three of these countries are severely cutting their defense posture and budget. These reductions are being driven by economic imperatives, not doctrine or strategy. Many of these reductions make good sense: there is no need for the heavy armored forces or logistics capabilities that were required under the Soviet offensive concept of operations. Still, if these reductions are carried too far, they could turn the region into a dangerous strategic vacuum that would invite Soviet pressure and open the possibility of their reoccupation during a crisis.

Ideally, Eastern European military forces should be sufficient to prevent such a vacuum, while at the same time being cheap enough so as not to retard economic development, and small enough so as not to threaten their neighbors. A happy medium would be a force

posture capable of raising the political and military price of Soviet invasion without possessing major offensive options. Unfortunately, this is a very big order. The cost of effective air defense, for example, is probably prohibitive. In all probability the individual Eastern European states will be unable to create a conventional force capability that will eliminate considerable and enduring risks for them. They will have to find other ways to deal with these risks.

One way to deal with these risks would be some sort of a regional defense alliance among the Eastern Europeans. Discussions concerning military cooperation are now under way between Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest. In practice, this course is likely to prove limited. There could be cooperation among defense industries, but more ambitious undertakings—for example, an integrated air defense system—are much more problematic. Once more, each of these countries wants to become part of the West, and they do not want to encourage the perception that they can be left to form a buffer zone of weak neutral states between the West and the Soviet Union.

Another possible means for Eastern European states to deal with these risks, of course, would be by the acquisition of nuclear weapons (or other weapons of mass destruction). These states have serious economic difficulties and limited resources, but nonetheless at least some of them do have the technical and industrial capability to design and build nuclear weapons. But there are strong antinuclear feelings throughout the region today, both toward the civil nuclear industry and toward nuclear weapons. The Chernobyl disaster had a profound effect on Eastern European attitudes, as well as those in the Baltic states, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine. All of the Eastern European states, with the exception of Albania, are signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and several of the Soviet republics have declared their intention to become nuclear-free zones.

The leaders of the new Eastern European governments have professed a lack of interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, and this appears to be genuine today. A nation such as Poland fully understands the risks of even being seen as moving in the direction of acquiring an ability to threaten the survival of the Soviet Union (or Germany). But in the future, it is conceivable that the Eastern Europeans could be driven toward the development of nuclear weapons if it appeared that the Soviet Union had irrevocable designs on them, if they gave up all hope that the West was prepared to extend a meaningful security guarantee, and if they feared that war was inevitable. Another theoretically possible set of conditions would involve the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one or more western Soviet republics as part of the breakup of the Union. This might trigger proliferation throughout the region, as one Eastern European state after another concluded that it could not go without nuclear weapons as long as its neighbors possessed them.

In short, the arguments against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Eastern European states are very strong, but there may be perceived incentives as well. These states do face some very real threats, whether from the Soviet Union, from their neighbors, or from ethnic turmoil in the region; in extreme circumstances nuclear weapons may look to be attractive as the ultimate credential for independence, as an equalizer for an inferior position in a security relationship (especially with the Soviet Union), and as a cheap means of defense. Those circumstances do not seem to be very likely at the moment, but they cannot be definitively ruled out over the longer term.

THE UNITED STATES, NATO, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The third panel focused on changes in American national defense policy, particularly short-range nuclear policy, during the past two years, as well as on the major changes being undertaken by the North Atlantic Alliance in its internal strategy review.

Background to the Changes in NATO Nuclear Policy

One presentation to this panel reviewed the major revision of NATO nuclear strategy and

force posture that began with an intensive series of interagency deliberations in Washington, D.C., in March 1990. The United States, having emerged successfully the previous spring from a difficult dispute within the alliance over SNF modernization and arms control, was not anxious to reopen nuclear issues within NATO. However, four reasons persuaded the Bush administration to move away from continued evolutionary adaptation and push instead for sweeping change:

- to preempt an expected Congressional decision to kill the *Lance* modernization program and be able to embed such a move in a positive adjustment of NATO strategy
- to defuse a potentially explosive issue in Germany's electoral politics at a time when Germany's political future was a vital concern for the United States
- to blunt a possible Soviet call (in the Two-Plus-Four talks) for the denuclearization of Germany as a condition of unity by displaying a marked shift in NATO's strategic approach
- to ensure a coordinated U.S. government approach to upcoming allied meetings of foreign and defense ministers

The president announced the cancellation of *Lance* modernization in May 1990, as he also described the agenda for an extraordinary NATO Summit. The London Declaration adopted at the July 1990 NATO Summit reshaped the alliance for the post-Cold War era. It included initiatives for a changed allied approach to theater nuclear forces.

- NATO abandoned its emphasis on forward defense and moved to smaller forces with a more multinational command structure.
- The doctrine of flexible response was replaced with a role for nuclear weapons only as weapons of last resort, abandoning reliance on early first use.
- The United States invited the USSR to join in withdrawing all nuclear artillery from Europe.
- The United States agreed to begin SNF arms-control talks with the Soviet Union upon signature of a CFE agreement, rather than waiting for the agreement to be implemented (the May 1989 position).

In elaborating the new doctrine of last resort during the balance of 1990, NATO's High Level Group (HLG) further explained that the new strategy would encompass much more flexibility in planning a smaller, principally air-delivered theater nuclear deterrent. Areas outside of the Soviet homeland were dropped from the target list. Preplanned options for selective nuclear use were dropped. The concept of general nuclear response became meaningless, with the planned withdrawal of nuclear artillery and most other theater nuclear weapons other than those carried by aircraft.

Instead, NATO's strategy emphasized the need for much smaller, versatile long-range forces that can hold a variety of targets at risk and demonstrate the readiness to employ U.S. strategic nuclear forces. A public description of NATO's new nuclear strategy can be expected in conjunction with the Rome NATO Summit in November 1991.

The most demanding contingency for NATO's nuclear forces, although a remote one now, would be to deter military aggression by whichever state ultimately controls the bulk of the largest armed forces on the Eurasian landmass, the Soviet military. NATO would do this by retaining a residual capability to strike a variety of targets in the territory of this state and underscore the credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear commitment to Europe's safety.

A somewhat more likely contingency, though still remote at this time, could be to deter aggression against a NATO member from a state other than the Soviet Union or Russia, such as a state in the Middle East or North Africa. Such deterrence would require NATO to be able to threaten nuclear retaliation if weapons of mass destruction were used, or were about to be used, against the territory of a NATO member state.

NATO's current nuclear forces are not well suited to performing needed missions in either the most demanding or the most likely contingencies for their use. Nuclear artillery and

short-range missiles based in central Europe have neither the range nor the flexibility needed for these missions. This is already understood by NATO planners, and both nuclear artillery and the *Lance* short-range ballistic missiles will therefore be withdrawn entirely from Europe.

Yet the United States and the alliance still consider the U.S. nuclear contribution to be essential, and basing U.S. weapons in other European states involves these allies in sharing the risks associated with a nuclear deterrent capability. Only the United States can provide effective extended deterrence on the European continent. Neither London nor Paris—much less other NATO allies—consider the British and French nuclear capability large or versatile enough to match the entire range of possible threats.

Germany, which has foresworn the production of nuclear weapons, may also not wish to rely on Britain or France for ultimate security against intimidation by other countries less inhibited about acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The United States certainly does not want any European state that currently lacks its own nuclear weapons to start building them. Both as a nuclear superpower and as a state that is at once detached from European rivalries yet bound to Europe's defense through NATO, the United States is likely to remain the paramount contributor to the alliance's deterrence of aggression.

The London Declaration

The major features of the big change in U.S.-NATO thinking about nuclear weapons in particular, and security policy in general, emerged in the London Summit Declaration of July 1990. The alliance used the declaration to bring itself up to date with the events of the previous year. Several initiatives were taken that are expected to culminate in public pronouncements at the November 1991 Rome Summit. The key areas of concern expressed in the London Declaration include: (a) ending the adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact states, and further developing the CSCE process; (b) changing the character of conventional defense; and (c) adapting the nuclear dimensions of NATO strategy to the new environment.

On this last point the London Declaration expressed a diminished emphasis on the nuclear aspects of NATO strategy and less reliance on substrategic weapons. Nuclear weapons are now characterized as weapons of last resort. The alliance recognizes the important and enduring contribution of nuclear weapons to deterrence, but the alliance also acknowledges that there are a number of future scenarios in which conventional weapons, in and of themselves, might be able to repel aggression and bring the hostilities to a conclusion at the earliest possible moment. The alliance seeks to achieve the lowest, most stable level of nuclear weapons needed to maintain the deterrent posture. Within this context the alliance agrees that it is important to retain uncertainty about how and when we might actually use nuclear weapons as a way of strengthening the underpinnings of this deterrent role.

In the London Declaration the alliance expressed its willingness to begin formal bilateral negotiations with the Soviets (as soon as the CFE treaty was signed) on the reduction or elimination of land-based SNF. The allies began working together on an agreed framework for the talks in the Special Consultative Group (SCG).

Government officials in Washington are not deluding themselves that future nuclear modernization, should it be deemed necessary for military reasons, will be easy or even likely because of political, economic, and technical constraints. Some allied governments (especially Germany) are currently asking tough questions about the role of remaining nuclear weapons in Europe, questions with direct applicability to new systems as well. For instance, against whom will such weapons be targeted? Even if one argues that such weapons in principle would not be targeted against Eastern Europe, their range and likely operational purpose suggest otherwise. This is of particular concern to the Germans, who feel a special responsibility for the security of Central Eu-

rope. Taking this argument even further, the alliance has declared that the USSR is no longer an adversary; how, some allies contend, can we then publicly claim that the alliance needs to maintain theater-based nuclear forces as a hedge against residual Soviet capabilities? In addition, there are also concerns in Western Europe that new nuclear systems such as TASM would circumvent the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The NATO Strategy Review

The NATO strategy review has proceeded on two tracks since the London Summit of July 1990. First, there was a brainstorming session within the North Atlantic Council on the future political role of the alliance. Some results of this activity were seen in the public statements following the May 1991 Copenhagen council meeting which set out a rough agenda and general guidelines for NATO's future role in Europe. The upcoming Rome Summit will further spell out the evolving role of NATO in the so called trans-Atlantic security partnership or the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Second, a Strategy Review Group (SRG), chaired by Michael Legge, has been formulating a new strategic concept for defense in NATO, which will fill the purpose once served by MC 14/3 (the old flexible-response strategy). This is likely to be a public document that will serve as a guide to the major commanders and other military planners in NATO for the development of a specific military strategy. Accordingly, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and national staffs have been working together on what that strategy might look like. The HLG has also contributed to this discussion, based on its October 1989 ministerial tasking to review the roles, missions, and characteristics of NATO's nuclear posture in li[illegible] th[illegible] [illegible]ement. The HLG [illegible] to include the e[illegible] [illegible] environment and future NATO force composition. The HLG's findings will form the principal basis for the nuclear elements of the new strategic concept. The HLG's final report will be provided to the NATO ministers this fall, in tandem with the submission of the strategic concept.

NATO needs to maintain concrete military capabilities as a hedge against instability in Central and Eastern Europe, to offset residual Soviet capabilities, and to meet potential threats from the Mediterranean region. There will thus be much less of a Central European focus because the alliance must now deal with a more diverse range of problems; future military forces must accordingly be more subtle, flexible, dispersed, and mobile. They must be capable of supporting a strategy of deescalating a crisis, rather than, as before, reinforcing the region in a crisis. The new threats are less obvious than before and are more likely to be a single-axis threat against NATO's flanks rather than a multiaxis attack in Central Europe.

Broad details of the new military order were released following the Defense Planning Committee meeting in the spring of 1991. NATO's forces in the future will be more mobile, with lower readiness, a lower exercise tempo, greater multinational integration, and with more reliance on reserves. The first to fight would be the Rapid Reaction Forces, consisting of a 60,000-troop multinational corps. (The most readily available of those forces would be the long-standing ACE Mobile Force.) The Main Defense Forces would consist of six corps, realigned to some extent to build up NATO's Southern Flank at the expense of the Central Front. The United States has made it clear that it would contribute at least two divisions, plus one armored cavalry regiment and three tactical fighter wings, to these restructured NATO forces. The U.S. contribution would be organized into two of the multinational corps, one American-led, the other a German-led corps. These forces would be part of the Main Defense, but the United States would also provide support to the Rapid Reaction Corps.

The first tenet of the Strategy Review is a reemphasis of the idea that nuclear weapons fulfill a largely political purpose. The allies believe that most crises in the future can be resolved through diplomacy, and that some of the limited contingencies can be handled ex-

clusively through a demonstration of our military resolve with conventional forces. This again reinforces the notion that nuclear weapons can be seen as weapons of last resort. However, the SRG is reiterating the ideas of the London Declaration that it will be important to maintain uncertainty about how and when nuclear weapons might be employed and that while we cannot identify exactly the specific threat against which these weapons will be addressed, the alliance still believes that these weapons should be available to demonstrate its determination to take all measures necessary to defend NATO territory from aggression.

The Strategy Review is being kept at a low profile, and is currently at a very sensitive juncture with the allies. The hope is to bring it to closure by the Rome Summit or shortly thereafter. The review is being stretched out because there is considerable interest among some of the allies in having a more structured and formal arms-control negotiating process to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe, one that would go beyond an attempt simply to codify the military changes that have come about as a consequence of the political changes in Central Europe. It is far from clear where the alliance may come out.

Evolving U.S. Nonstrategic Nuclear Force Structure and Policy

With the planned elimination of short-range nuclear missiles and artillery-fired atomic projectiles from the U.S. force posture, both in Europe and for other contingencies, longer-range air- and sea-delivered nonstrategic nuclear forces (NSNFs) will become relatively prominent. This said, American thinking on nonstrategic nuclear forces is moving in the direction of less reliance on such systems, a corresponding reduction in the stockpile, and possibly greater reliance on reinforcement capability. (This corresponds to the general direction of the new U.S. defense strategy, and it has met with a high degree of consensus in the alliance.) There has been public discussion of moving most or all of the U.S. nuclear weapons dedicated to NATO off the Continent, to be redeployed in the event of a crisis (the so-called reconstitution approach). The current thinking within the alliance, however, seems to point toward a continued peacetime U.S. nuclear presence in Europe. The need to ensure broad national participation in nuclear roles seems to be driving the physical retention of U.S. nuclear weapons.

As noted above, with the change in character of the threat, conventional defense becomes more feasible and the use of nuclear weapons less necessary. Nevertheless, it is recognized that NSNF systems do provide some militarily significant contributions to a force planner. They act as a deterrent against Soviet and third-world nuclear use, as a hedge against conventional failure, as an agent of escalation control, as a means of burden sharing, as a deterrent or response to chemical and biological weapons, and as militarily effective instruments. The United States is also making a conscious effort to move away from Euro-centric views of security, taking a more global perspective when it comes to NSNF strategies and weapons systems.

Options for the Future

One of the workshop participants set out his views on how the United States ought to think about, and try to shape, the future of short-range nuclear forces especially as they apply to Europe. According to this view the current period is one of transition. Nuclear-weapon deployments are no longer a public issue. The alliance has years before any new force decisions need to be made. This gives NATO and the United States a rare political opportunity. The old rules have been broken, there is no pressure to make immediate decisions to replace the old structures, and there is time and opportunity to shape the debate on future NSNF forces to the alliance's liking.

Because the direct threat to NATO has now devolved into a latent threat, many states have begun drastically cutting their defense structures. Conventional forces in European states may soon become too fragile and unbalanced to capably conduct modern, combined arms

warfare. This could give nuclear weapons a greater role in future crisis management. In addition, as countries outside Europe increasingly rely on weapons of mass destruction to counter American global power, NSNF may prove valuable as deterrents or counters to such weapons. As a consequence we may see a greatly increased reliance on nonstrategic weapons as a deterrent. To move in this direction we need a radically restructured NSNF force without resorting to arms control.

Management requirements for future NSNF forces fall into three categories.

- *Political management.* Political elites need to shape the debate on the role of nuclear weapons, combine force modernization with the necessary restructuring of military forces, and avoid arms-control negotiations on SNF. They can preempt and outflank pressures for nuclear arms control through proper restructuring. In addition, to avoid controversy they should consider the qualitative modernization of dual-capable platforms rather than of the weapons themselves.
- *Operational management.* Leaders need to explain their plans and contingencies. The alliance needs formidable-sounding numbers of weapons; too few become a joke instead of a deterrent. These weapons need to be mobile, long-ranged, penetrative, and have flexible command, control, and communications. These requirements are best fulfilled by aircraft— not just traditional European-based fighters but a mix of types, depending on the mission.
- *Radical restructuring of American SNF forces.* The United States should consider eliminating the Army's nuclear role. It should protect its dual-capable aircraft from arms-control cuts by creating an unassailable position, thereby out-flanking probable German opposition to new weapons.

The U.S. Navy should eliminate its surface nuclear mission. This would improve naval survivability and gain political capital with the Soviet Union.

Discussion

In the short discussion period that followed the panel presentations, several participants stressed that the HLG and SRG have done admirable work so far in attempting to revamp NATO's entire strategy on such a scale. It was noted, however, that this is unlikely to be the last major change required in NATO's history, only the most recent one.

With respect to the American position on arms control, one person suggested that it is the older political elites who maintain traditional notions of the value of arms-control negotiations, while younger mid-level bureaucrats recognize the rationale for the United States to avoid NSNF negotiations and attempt to educate the European allies and their superiors as to the new situation. The United States needs to be cautious, however, not to appear to be determining this future nuclear strategy over the heads of its European allies, especially because it is announcing that any new strategy must include broad allied participation.

Finally, the likely outcome that the United States and NATO will rely on air-delivered weapons in the future runs up against a major bureaucratic roadblock: the U.S. Air Force does not like the tactical nuclear mission, nor does it care to plan or prepare for it.

WESTERN EUROPE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In the day's final session two speakers gave presentations on the major European powers. The first addressed the projected force modernization programs of France and Great Britain, and other European nuclear issues, and the second presented an analysis of Germany and its probable position relative to European security in the decade ahead.

British Nuclear Forces

The British plan to maintain an independent nuclear deterrent capability for an indefinite future and are currently procuring four *Vanguard*-class submarines with *Trident* II (D-5) missiles to replace their old Polaris fleet begin-

ning in the mid 1990s. The British may deploy fewer warheads per missile than the maximum number of warheads each missile could carry. This will still represent a major increase in total deliverable warheads over the current nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN) force, and the British retain the option to increase the D-5 warhead loading if Soviet ballistic-missile defenses should increase.

Finding a replacement for the other British nuclear weapon, the WE-177 gravity bomb, is more contentious. The British seem inclined to postpone this decision as long as possible. The candidate systems are all air-launched missiles: the ASLP, which would be a cooperative program with the French to develop an extended-range Air-Sol Moyenne Porté (ASMP); a version of the American SRAM (cancelled in September 1991), or the American SLAT. The criteria for the British decision involve cost, operational effectiveness, timing, and political symbolism. Cooperation with the French would promote Western European defense cooperation and diversify Britain's options. Cooperation with the Americans would support the long-standing special relationship between Washington and London. (Some British observers are concerned that a decision to coproduce the ASLP with Paris might meet with disapproval from the United States, despite the official American position of indifference.) Some British experts are also concerned that the French might dedicate their ASLP systems to both the prestrategic and strategic missions; this could raise questions about escalation control. Finally, some British observers fear that the selection of the ASLP, whose range would exceed the limits for air-launched cruise missiles in START and for ground-launched systems in INF, could cause perceptual problems, even though Britain is not a party to either of these agreements.

The Labour Party has recently shifted back toward the middle of the political spectrum under the leadership of Neil Kinnock and now seems likely, should it come back to power, to keep *Trident*. It might cancel the air-launched replacement program, however, in order to save money and placate the antinuclear faction within its ranks.

French Nuclear Forces

The French will continue to have a more diverse nuclear posture than the British, although there are a number of internal controversies over the future composition and purpose of France's nuclear forces. There is no controversy over the strategic SSBN fleet, which is regarded as the most reliable and survivable element. (Current plans call for the deployment of six SSBNs, but if the French navy is able to demonstrate an ability to keep three submarines on station with a fleet of only five boats, it may become difficult politically to justify the purchase of a sixth SSBN.) The current force is equipped with the M-4 and the M-20 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); the M-45 SLBM will be deployed in the mid to late 1990s, and the even more advanced missile, the M-5, may be delayed until 2005.

The French intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) force, consisting of eighteen silo-based S-3 missiles, is aging, and there has been a long debate over whether to field a mobile replacement. President Mitterrand and the Socialists have opposed the mobile IRBM concept for three principal reasons: cost (especially if the IRBM program would detract from the higher-priority SSBN and SLBM programs); the risk that mobile IRBM exercises might stir public anxieties; and the judgment that France's territory is too small to make land-mobile deployments advantageous. Mitterrand's July 1991 decision to cancel the S-45 missile development program was consistent with these long-standing reservations. The Socialists may be inclined to replace some or all of the S-3 missiles with land-based versions of the M-45 or M-5 SLBMs in refurbished silos. The center-right, on the other hand, tends to support a mobile IRBM for reasons of survivability and flexibility, and points to the survivability of the Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf war to refute claims about the potential vulnerability of mobile missiles.

The *Mirage* IV-P bombers equipped with medium-range ASMP missiles are to be retired in 1996, and the development of the ASLP is unlikely before the year 2000. The *Mirage* 2000Ns, also equipped with the ASMP, will be limited to the present 45 instead of the projected 75. The French Air Force is interested in replacing the *Mirage* IV-P with Rafale fighter-bombers equipped with the ASLP for both strategic and prestrategic missions. A decision on this may be made this fall, when a new five-year military program law is expected.

France's prestrategic arsenal in the 1990s will consist of 20 *Hades* launchers with 40 missiles (scaled back from the originally planned 60 launchers and 120 missiles); 45 *Mirage* 2000N aircraft with the short-range ASMP missile; and 20 *Super Etendard* aircraft with ASMP. The *Hades*, a land-based nuclear missile, has been criticized since 1989 as being unsuited to the new Europe (that is, given its 480-kilometer range, the *Hades* can only reach German or Eastern European territory). In September 1991, the French decided to further reduce the number of *Hades* to be procured, and to keep them in central storage rather than deploy them with field units.

Other European Nuclear Issues

Given the difficulties that may emerge between the United States and Germany over nuclear weapons, some Europeans have attempted to revive an old proposed solution to this problem: the extension by Britain and/or France of a nuclear guarantee over the Western European nations, either on a national basis, or through the creation of an independent European nuclear capability and policy. (The latter would presumably consist of some or all of the current British and French nuclear forces.) This solution remains dubious because of the traditional reluctance of Britain and France to extend explicit or precise nuclear guarantees to nonnuclear allies. Aside from Britain's participation in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, neither Britain nor France appears ready to share much information with nonnuclear allies, much less decision-making. Germany and other nonnuclear Western European states have also shown relatively little interest in such a European nuclear solution, presumably because their confidence in the American nuclear guarantee remains higher than their confidence in London and Paris.

With respect to nuclear targeting, the British and French, like the United States, will now find it politically awkward to plan nuclear strikes against non-Soviet territory. In particular, French nuclear employment strategy has been overcome by events since 1989; its prestrategic forces are no longer usable in Eastern Europe as a final warning prior to anti-city attacks on the USSR because there will soon be no Soviet military targets outside of Soviet territory. As a consequence, the two Western European nuclear powers may in the future think about nonstrategic employment in terms of attacking remotely situated military targets at sea or in the Soviet Union (or Russia).

Questions have also been raised about the role that British and French nuclear forces might play in the context of nuclear proliferation outside but near Europe--for example, in a future Desert Shield/Storm operation against a regional power that possessed nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The most likely policy was articulated by President Mitterrand in February 1991, when he argued that the coalition should not use chemical weapons (or nuclear or biological weapons), even in retaliation, on the ground that the coalition had sufficient conventional means to ensure victory and that the use of such weapons would be "a retreat towards barbarism." British and French leaders will be reluctant to articulate employment policies for nuclear forces outside of Europe because of the risk that doing so would provoke domestic controversy over the primary function of Western nuclear forces—which remains to balance Soviet (or Russian) capabilities and deter coercion or aggression by Moscow.

Germany

There are four critical points to make about Germany and the future of nuclear weapons in

Europe. First, Germany is heading toward a minimal deterrence policy. Under the best of circumstances, it might allow, at most, up to 100 modernized air-delivered nuclear warheads on German soil through the mid 1990s as an acceptable form of existential deterrence. These weapons would not be targeted at anyone in particular. Second, Germany will not raise the issue of SNF modernization at this time. The Germans do not wish to complicate their relations with either the Americans or the Soviets. Third, German security views are adrift and will not solidify into a coherent policy position until after the Soviet forces withdraw in 1994. In such a fluid situation the United States may be able to exercise some influence over Germany's perceptions, although until the Soviets leave, Berlin will be extremely sensitive to avoid taking on a new nuclear role or otherwise seeming to pose a new threat to other countries. Fourth, unlike the British and the French, who have and will retain their independent nuclear forces, the Germans face several fundamental nuclear decisions in their near future. Should they pursue an arms control track? A European nuclear option? Or an independent German nuclear capability?

Of the options listed above, the Germans are most likely to follow the arms-control track through the 1990s. Germany is now legally sovereign, but it is not equal to its major European partners in one major respect: it does not possess nuclear weapons. By emphasizing nuclear arms-control negotiations, Berlin can, in part, level the intra-West European playing field and reduce the advantages that military issues have traditionally provided to the French and British. This German interest will probably extend beyond NSNF into a post-START strategic arms-control process that ultimately reduces U.S. and Soviet forces to a level at which the French and British nuclear forces become included. (One of the consequences of unification may be that the Germans are less sensitive to the concerns of Paris and London that their national nuclear forces not be included.)

Over the longer term, Berlin might consider a European deterrent, depending on the progress that London and Paris might make in nuclear cooperation by the year 2000, but the Germans are unlikely to push this development themselves. Beyond the year 2000 one can postulate scenarios in which an independent German nuclear option might seem attractive. This would require not only a reemergence of the Soviet threat, but also a breakdown in the nonproliferation regime and the spread of nuclear weapons to other European states, coupled with the lack of a convincing American or British/French security guarantee. Short of such a dramatic change in the strategic environment, the domestic political barriers to German acquisition of nuclear weapons and the fears of neighboring states are for now much too great for any change in Germany's nuclear status.

There are several underlying factors that will decisively influence Germany and the nuclear future. First and foremost, there is the dramatically changed security environment. The battle line has moved 1,000 kilometers to the east. Germany is no longer a front-line state. This fundamentally alters the way Germany sees its own security—the world is seen as being much less threatening to the Germans. There is a sense that the deutschemark is stronger than the *force de frappe*—that economic power is the means by which Germany will exercise its influence. There is no substantial body of German opinion that grants military power any usefulness in today's world, or that can conceive of circumstances in which Germany might use military force.

Second, German unification raises questions about relations with the Soviet Union. Getting the Soviet forces out of eastern Germany is the number one security priority in Germany today. This, in turn, affects decisions on NATO's future force structure, because the Germans do not want to agree to anything that might antagonize the Soviets and cause them to reconsider their commitment to withdraw. This will be a major constraint on the way that the Germans think about the future role of nuclear weapons

Third, there are strong antimil[illegible] and anti-nuclear sentiments in Germa[illegible] that could reemerge if given the opportunity. The most recent [illegible] opinion [illegible] that over 50 percent of West German[illegible] [illegible] in the eastern *Laender* [illegible] or nuclear weapons, ev[illegible] [illegible] retains its nuclear [illegible] the most pro-nuclear German [illegible] the CDU [illegible] has lost a string of state elections and is therefore unlikely [illegible] any issue dealing with nuclear [illegible] in the present political situation. (Also, [illegible] [illegible]DU leaders are not inclined to focus on defense issues.)

All these constraining domestic factors point to no major German commitment to nuclear modernization, despite the fluid strategic environment.

Finally, a fourth underlying factor is the United States' declining leverage on German policy, a trend that may accelerate after Soviet troops leave and the next elections are held in [illegible], especially if an SPD government emerges. Such a government would certainly not approve any nuclear modernization and would probably seek the removal of any remaining nuclear forces from German soil. The logic of nuclear first-use, in the absence of forward-deployed Soviet forces, will also be challenged. The old congressional argument, "no nukes, no troops," will increasingly become a threat that could actually backfire if Germany sees no need for U.S. troops stationed there.

With this declining U.S. leverage, there is little likelihood of nuclear modernization in the foreseeable future, unless there would be dramatic and negative developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Even then it might not be possible to push the Germans in the direction of new nuclear weapons—Berlin will not want to provoke an unstable and fearful Soviet Union. The only possible scenario for any form of modernization would be in the context of a dramatic arms-control initiative that demonstrated NATO's willingness to move further down the path of eventual denuclearization. Such a package would go beyond the declaration that nuclear weapons were weapons of last resort: it might include an explicit strategy of minimum deterrence and no-first-use, and the decision to reduce NATO's stockpile to something on the order of 100 nuclear weapons. This package would be formally negotiated with the Soviets, and the Germans would be key participants in this process. Such an effort to legitimate a small NATO deterrent force would admittedly complicate U.S. relations with the United Kingdom and France. And there is no indication that either the U.S. or the German government is inclined to pursue such a major initiative at this time, particularly in light of the unilateral steps set forth in President Bush's September 27, 1991, speech.

Discussion

The workshop participants emphasized that the future of nuclear weapons in Europe would ultimately be determined by gross political factors rather than by refined discussions about doctrine, force structure, and targeting. Simply put, the Western European nations are going through a revolution in their thinking about security and in their relationships among themselves and with the United States. The outcome of this process is unclear, most especially to the Europeans themselves.

The key to all of this is the Germans, who remain an enigma, even to themselves. At the present time there is simply no consensus among German political elites about the fundamental national security interests of this newly-united regime. Too much has happened over the past few years, and too much remains to be done with the new east German states, for a serious public consideration of Germany and its place in the world. The workshop participants saw two factors that might trigger this sea change in German politics: the final withdrawal of Soviet forces from German territory, now scheduled for 1994, and a victory by the Social Democratic Party in the next national elections, also scheduled for 1994. The participants viewed the former event as almost certain, and the latter quite likely.

Several participants expressed the view that, by the middle of the decade, political pressures in Germany will probably lead to the removal

of U.S. nuclear weapons and possibly all allied military forces—from German soil. This development, along with other political trends that are now evident, will force a major readjustment of the European security system, most likely leading to a marginalization of the American role on the continent (as that role has traditionally been defined since the late 1940s).

On the whole the workshop participants did not believe that this was a good outcome, either for American interests or for long-term European security. The central question is: What is the best way to relegitimate the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe and their positive role in allied strategy, especially to the Germans? (No one at the workshop challenged the point that nuclear weapons should continue to play an important role in allied security policy.)

There were two general lines of argument on this question. The first policy alternative involved reaching a grand bargain with the Germans, in the form of a dramatic arms-control/policy initiative that would seek to preempt German concerns about nuclear weapons. One approach, prior to the cancellation of TASM, might have been to proclaim a no-first-use policy in return for German agreement to continue to accept a small number of modernized nuclear systems (TASM) on German soil. The U.S. unilateral initiative on September 27, 1991, clearly hopes, by eliminating ground-based TNF, to achieve agreement on the retention of a reduced stockpile of nuclear gravity bombs in Europe. The second policy alternative was based on the assumption that such preemptive concessions to German public opinion would only reinforce the delegitimation of nuclear weapons, and that there remain important, perhaps dominant, elements in German politics that understand (or can be reminded) of the importance of nuclear deterrence. This second alternative preferred to focus on the fact that nuclear weapons will seem more, rather than less, central to the war-prevention task of the alliance as NATO's conventional forces are sharply reduced in the wake of impending budget reductions.

In either case the workshop participants expressed concern that too many pressing nuclear issues are not being discussed or seriously considered—the Germans, in particular, seem inclined toward a conspiracy of silence (despite the fact that generally high marks were given to the alliance deliberations on nuclear policy that are now taking place under the rubric of the NATO Strategy Review). The workshop discussion pointed to the conclusion that the nuclear problem in the alliance will not go away for lack of attention, and that the United States would be better off to begin to put these issues on the table now—presumably in such a way, however, as to avoid triggering a major public controversy.

CONCLUSION

The issues under discussion at this workshop, it turned out, were not about weapons, or modernization, or arms control, although those were the terms in which the discussion was couched. The real issue was the future political arrangement of Europe, with Germany playing the central role in that question. Future allied discussions in these areas are going to be much more of a two-way street than the United States would like.

The future of nuclear weapons in Europe remains highly uncertain. The most likely scenario, and the one to which most workshop participants seemed to subscribe, is that American nuclear weapons will be eliminated from the European continent through public and political pressures in the mid to late 1990s. The most optimistic scenario would involve reaching an agreement with the Europeans—effectively, the Germans—to keep a small number of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as a minimum deterrent force. There is strong evidence that the Soviet government, or a successor central government, would accept such a solution. These U.S. systems would almost certainly be air-delivered.

The major changes witnessed in the international political environment over the past two years mean that the United States can no longer

be satisfied with tinkering with minor adjustments to bilateral relations. Barring a return of a direct Soviet threat and the reemergence of East-West conflict, there is no chance of returning to the old ways of doing business in Europe—including NATO's traditional nuclear business.

Attendees

The Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe Workshop
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Center for National Security Studies
July 26, 1991

External Participants

Harold Agnew, consultant
Stephen Flanagan, Department of State
Roger George, National Intelligence Council
Paul Herman, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Catherine Kelleher, Brookings Institution
Robbin Laird, Institute for Defense Analyses
Jeff L[illegible]n, U.S. Air Force Academy
Doug Lawson, Sandia National Laboratories
Jo[illegible] Lellenberg, Department of Defense
Robert Perret, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
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Kon Sch[illegible], Joint Staff [illegible]
Richard Shearer, consultant
David Stein, Department of Energy
Larry Tinberg, Department of Defense
David Yost, Naval Postgraduate School
Paul Viotti, U.S. Air Force Academy
Philip Zelikow, Harvard University

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Tom Larson, M-1
Paul White, X-DO
Don Wolkerstorfer, X-DO
Richard Krajik, X-4
George Hill, WX-DO
Lyle Edwards, WX-1
John Ruminer, WX-11
Damon Ciovanielli, P-DO

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ABSTRACT

A summary is presented of a workshop that addressed the future of nuclear weapons in Europe. The workshop topics included the evolving European security environment; the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and nuclear weapons; the United States, NATO, and nuclear weapons; and Western Europe and nuclear weapons. The workshop, held at Los Alamos July 26, 1991, was sponsored by the Center for National Security Studies of the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

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